

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

OCTOBER 8, 1964

Election

NO. 442

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 8, 1964

The following is the State Department's release of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's news conference, which is authorized for direct quotation:

SECRETARY RUSK: Good morning, gentlemen.

I have no opening statement. I am ready for your questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, Chancellor Erhard has indicated the United States and Germany might consider forming the multilateral nuclear fleet by themselves if the other allies decide not to go along. Would the United States do this?

A Well, this is a contingency that has not yet arisen. We and ~~the~~ German Government agree that the multilateral force should be a force which has the participation of a considerable number of NATO countries. As you know, there is a working group of eight nations that has been meeting in Paris to look into this matter. Our own target continues to be that that was stated in the joint communique of Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson in June of this year, in which they said that they were agreed that the proposed multilateral force would make a

significant addition to this military and political strength--that is of NATO--and that efforts should be continued to ready an agreement for signature by the end of the year.

Now we are at the end of the first week in October. That group in Paris is working continuously. We still have the purpose of going ahead with that force with the participation of a considerable number of NATO countries, and I am sure that that is the objective both in NATO and both--and in Bonn and in Washington. Therefore I think that these contingencies, alternative contingencies have not arisen, our purpose continues to be the same, and I am optimistic about the outcome.

Q Mr. Secretary, while we are on the subject of NATO and nuclear weapons, Senator Goldwater says that the NATO Commander-in-Chief has some authority to use nuclear weapons. Is that correct?

A Well, I am not going to embroider on what the President has said in his Seattle speech. This is a matter for the President and for the Secretary of Defense, and my task as Secretary of State is to keep this problem very much on the hypothetical list, because my purpose is

to try to work out our relations with other countries to protect the vital interests of the United States without having that issue come to the front. But I have nothing to add whatever to what the President said in his Seattle speech on that subject.

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been reports from Saigon, in fact even some whispering here in Washington, to the effect that the Administration is now considering some major turn in its policy toward South Viet-Nam but is holding any decision off until after the election. I wonder, sir, if you have any comment on this?

A Yes. I should like to hit that one just as hard as I possibly can. South Viet-Nam is a major issue of war and peace. The question of whether Hanoi and Peiping will leave their southern neighbors alone is a major issue. This is not a matter which any President of the United States can deal with in electoral terms, and I can tell you--and I hope it is not an indiscretion--that the President has made it very clear to his own principal advisers that the decisions that are required with respect to South Viet-Nam have nothing to do with the American elections. No President can take such a view on such a

far-reaching and basic issue of war and peace. And so our policy is to do everything that we can to assist the Vietnamese to meet this problem. We can not with certainty predict the future, because there are those in Hanoi and Peiping who are helping to write the scenario on this problem, but we are deeply committed to the security of Southeast Asia and to the security of South Viet-Nam. This has nothing to do with our electoral process here. We are not concealing anything or postponing or marking time or refusing to make the decisions that are required by that situation because there is an election going on in this country. No President could do that, Republican or Democrat, and there is just nothing in that kind of talk whatever.

Q Mr. Secretary, sir, with the UN session due to open in November, the United States and the Soviet Union appear to be headed on a collision course over the matter of the peace-keeping assessments and loss of vote. Do you see any prospect for resolving this issue? And, secondly, if this issue is not resolved amicably, would you anticipate that it could be a blockade to other East-West adjustments?

A Well, Mr. Marder, first let me emphasize that this is not an issue between the Soviet Union and the United States. This is an issue between the Soviet Union and certain other countries who have not paid their assessments in accordance with the decisions of the General Assembly and all the rest of the United Nations. The attitude of the Soviet Union on this matter is somewhat like the troika proposals. Their attitude deeply affects the constitutional structure of the United Nations. Now, the ability to assess contributions is the only mandatory authority which the General Assembly possesses, and this is the only mandatory authority in which the great bulk of the United Nations membership participates. Every small country member of the United Nations has a stake in this constitutional issue in the United Nations itself, so the issue here is not a bilateral issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. The question is whether the United Nations is going to continue on the basis of the charter, and Article 19 is very precise and specific on this point.

So that we hope very much that some arrangement can be made by which this issue is removed. We are not asking

for or looking for some disagreeable and bitter confrontation on this point. But we do recognize that this point is essential to the future integrity and structure of the United Nations, and that every member has a stake in it. Now we hope that somehow some arrangement can be made, some payments made, some solution found before the General Assembly opens in November. But we have no doubt whatever that there is involved here a basic constitutional issue for the United Nations as a whole. It is in no sense a bilateral issue between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Q Well, sir, just to follow that up, on the second part of that question, while it is not essentially a bilateral issue between the United States and the Soviet Union, if in fact this issue is not agreed to in the United Nations, would the net effect of the disagreement be a general impediment to measures to reach further diminution of tension between East and West.

A Well, I think it is too soon yet to comment on that. You will recall that in the troika proposal when the Soviet Union found itself faced with the near

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unanimity of the entire United Nations, they found a way to modify their attitude. And I think that it is important for the overwhelming majority of the United Nations to make it clear that on this issue, this basic constitutional issue, that some adjustment in the Soviet position will have to be found.

I can't predict for you what will happen a month from now when the General Assembly opens, but of course this is an issue which will be there, unless it is solved before then--it will be there when the hammer falls for the opening of the General Assembly, because it will arise in connection with the first vote cast in the proceedings of the General Assembly.

Q Mr. Secretary, some of the nonaligned countries attending the Cairo conference suspect that it is the United States that is behind Mr. Tshombe's insistence upon being seated there. Would you care to comment on this, sir?

A Well, the question--the precise answer to your question is that we are not behind anything in this particular situation. But we are quite a few thousand miles away in a situation that is changing from hour to

hour, and I would prefer not to comment on it any further. I think it is of some concern, some importance that in an international meeting delegates undertake to determine who shall represent governments invited to the meeting, because if that principle were followed very far it could go a very long way and give rise to a great many complications in the very structure of international affairs. But we are not involved in this particular episode and I think it is better for me not to say very much about it.

Q Mr. Secretary, a moment ago in connection with this UN problem, you mentioned the--you used the words "arrangement" and "adjustment". Just to clarify your view would the United States support any solution that would be anything less than full compliance with the assessments and full payments?

A No. I think there has to be an application and enforcement of Article 19 of the Charter. That is a basic attitude not only of our Government but of a great many others.

Remember that the World Court decision on this subject was ratified, approved by a majority of something like I think 75 to, what was it, 15 or 17, in the General Assembly. And the World Court decided that these were proper assessments, they are part of the regular expenses of the organization, and that they were compulsory upon members. So that there is no question whatever about our view and the view of what we consider to be a very substantial majority of the United Nations on this point.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have done a good deal of speaking within the country. I wonder if you could reflect upon that for a minute and tell us what parts of the

Administration's foreign policy seem to puzzle or perplex people most as reflected in the questions that you get as you go around the country?

A Well, I felt, as I have been around the country in the last three and a half years, that there continues to be a very broad public support for the main lines of the bipartisan policy of the United States in this post war period--support for the United Nations; support for our great alliances; support for foreign aid, although people would be glad to be relieved of that burden if it were possible to be relieved; support for trade expansion; for the Peace Corps; for the Alliance for Progress, and all these other great elements in our bipartisan policy.

Now, it is true that we are carrying heavy burdens, but freedom has never been free and those burdens are necessary. And I have myself gotten the impression in my discussions with groups, both in public sessions and in private conversations that most of the American people understand the requirements of this present world situation. I have not myself encountered, shall I say, bitter partisan aspects on this matter. Although I'm sure that those with whom I have talked include supporters

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of both principal candidates. But when you can sit down in a quiet conversation with people, I think you will find that reason normally prevails.

I could illustrate that in another way, Mr. Frankel. I have attended now perhaps at least 200 executive sessions of Congressional committees to talk about difficult and complex and sometimes dangerous foreign policy issues. Not once have the judgments of those committees divided along partisan lines, not once.

Now, there have been differences of view because many of these problems involve on balance decisions, almost knife edge, hair-line decisions because they are complicated and difficult. But those differences of judgment have not followed partisan patterns in these executive sessions where you can talk out the full difficulty and the full agony of these situations.

I don't really believe, despite the fact that we are in a very, shall we say, lively electoral campaign, I don't really believe that the principal issues in our relations with the rest of the world are partisan in character or accepted by the American people as being partisan in character.

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Q Mr. Secretary?

A Yes?

Q Mr. William Miller, the gentleman against whom for one brief shining moment you were considered a possible opponent, has brought up the issue of the Cuban situation again, saying that our policy doesn't offer anything to the people in Cuba who want freedom there. I wonder if you could review whether you believe our policy there is bearing fruit?

A Well, that invites a considerable essay, because the present Administration was not responsible for the prevention of a Communist Cuba. We were confronted with the problem of cure, and the cure is more difficult than prevention.

But we felt that it was very important to work in harmony with and in solidarity with the other members of this Hemisphere, that this should not be treated as solely a bilateral problem, partly because to the extent there was a problem it was more of a problem for many of our neighbors than it was for the United States, given our power and given the solidarity and integrity of our own political institutions.

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We have been very much encouraged by the attitude of the rest of the Hemisphere toward this problem. Whereas in the Autumn of 1960 it was not possible for the Hemisphere even to refer to Cuba as the source of a threat, in the meetings of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este in 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis and at the end of July in Washington of this year, it was very clear that the Hemisphere has moved to the full recognition of the nature of this threat to the Hemisphere and has taken steps to deal with it and meet it.

Now, I think it's very important that we move on an OAS basis and I believe that has been suggested also by some of the candidates on the other side. But that carries with it the obligation to consult with and act in solidarity with the other members of the Hemisphere in all aspects of this problem.

Now, in the most recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers, we applied what might probably be considered the remaining peaceful measures with respect to Cuba, to make it clear to Castro that his attempt to interfere in other countries of this Hemisphere must stop and must stop now. We hope very much, all of us in the Hemisphere, that

that message gets through, and is taken seriously, because it was a most serious step.

As you know, 19 of the 20 members of the Hemisphere have broken relations with Castro. Trade has been broken between the Hemisphere and Castro, except in foodstuffs and medicines. Sea transportation has been interrupted except as required for humanitarian purposes. And other countries in other parts of the world have been asked by the Hemisphere to consider what steps they can take to express their solidarity with this Hemisphere in dealing with this problem.

Now, if the Cuban Government continues with any program of interference with other countries in this Hemisphere, then I think we shall have a very serious situation and we shall have to deal with it on a hemispheric basis.

Q Mr. Secretary, within the last week India has said, in light of some possibilities of Chinese nuclear explosion, that it can change its policy and start developing nuclear weapons within a year or 18 months if they consider it necessary. What would the United States

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attitude be toward this development if India does decide it was necessary to change its policy?

A Well, it is my impression that the Prime Minister and other officials in the Indian Government have indicated that their attitude moves in the other direction. It is true, as I think all of us know, that India has the capacity to move, and to move fairly promptly, into the nuclear weapons field. They have the necessary capacity in nuclear physics, they have the necessary industrial plant. But they have indicated that they do not intend to go down this trail.

We feel that India's decision to direct its exploitation of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes only is a great contribution to world peace and to the welfare of humanity, both in India and throughout the world. India's policy, which was restated by Prime Minister Shastri just yesterday, sharply contrasts with that of Communist China.

You see, here's a country that is among those who could move in this direction and they have announced that they do not intend to move in this direction. And

that is a course of restraint and moderation which looks toward the longer range possibilities of peace. You see, it's not just a question of whether one other nuclear power comes into being. The question is what happens if 15, 20, 25 nuclear powers come into being. And it is important that all governments look at this as a very sober problem, as to how we deal with this Pandora's box that was opened some 20 years ago.

Q Mr. Secretary, particularly in the light of the talks here this week with President Macapagal of the Philippines, would you assess or reassess for us how you see the situation between Indonesia and Malaysia; and, also whether you share the concern of the Philippine Government that they, too, may become a target for Indonesian infiltration, or interference of some sort?

A Well, on the first point, it has been our hope all along that such issues as exist between Malaysia and Indonesia can be settled by peaceful processes. We joined with eight other members of the Security Council in expressing our very deep concern about the armed actions taken by Indonesia against Malaysia.

We see no reason, looking at it objectively from a distance, as to why these two countries need to be in any sort of armed conflict with each other. We think it is very important that the normal processes of peaceful settlement be employed for whatever disputes exist, and that all parties act in accordance with the Charter.

On the second part of your question, I point out that our own defense arrangements with the Philippines are very far-reaching, are without qualification, and that if

there is an attack on the Philippines from any quarter, that is an attack on the United States. And I would think that it would be very reckless, indeed, for anyone to suppose that there is any doubt whatever about our commitment to the security of the Philippines.

Q Mr. Secretary, it has been several years since the neutralists or nonaligned leaders have gotten together, as they are now in Cairo. Can you say whether you see any new trends in the direction of that movement, or any new tone in the content of the discussions that are going on now in Cairo?

A Well, quite frankly, I haven't had very much information yet on just how those discussions are going. They have not yet made public pronouncements in a communique or in resolutions passed, at least that I am aware of. And, as you know, a certain episode involving the Congo has taken the newspaper play away from the other things that might be considered by that conference.

So that, perhaps, if this press conference were being held tomorrow, I might be able to be more responsive to your question. But it is too early yet, I think, to say.

As you know, President Johnson sent a message to

the conference which outlines our attitude toward it. We hope they have a good meeting, and that they deal responsibly with some of the very large issues that are before the world community.

We may get some indication from that meeting as to attitudes on questions that will undoubtedly come up before the next meeting of the General Assembly. But it is too soon yet for me to comment.

Q Mr. Secretary, yesterday, Prime Minister Shastri proposed that a delegation be sent to China to try to dissuade the Peking Government from detonating some kind of nuclear device. I wonder, sir, if it would be the position of the U. S. Government to support this kind of general approach to the Chinese, to dissuade them?

A Well, this is a nonaligned conference. And it is not for me to get in the way of a nonaligned conference by expressing a view on this matter.

But I do recall that almost all of the members of this conference now meeting in Cairo have, in times past, expressed their very great interest in the elimination of nuclear testing, and, particularly, nuclear testing in the atmosphere. This has been made clear at the United Nations.

Their spokesmen at the Geneva Disarmament Conference made this clear. I think all of them who were there, or practically all of them who were there, have signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

So I would suppose that the prospect of the resumption of atmospheric testing would be a matter of deep concern to them. How they would deal with it is for them to judge.

Yes, sir.

Q Mr. Secretary, going back to an earlier question on Viet-Nam, and forgetting the election date for a minute: do you foresee a shift in the Administration policy towards a deeper involvement in the political, military, and economic situation there; of course, assuming that President Johnson is reelected?

A Well, it is not for me to try to predict the future.

As I say, on a day by day, and week by week basis, we make the necessary decisions in consultation with the South Vietnamese Government that we feel are required by the situation.

But, since there are others who are writing the

scenario for the future, I don't want to undertake to be a prophet here. I do want to make it very clear, however, that we are not going to pull away from our commitments to the security of Southeast Asia, and specifically South Viet-Nam.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have seen General Phoumi Nosovan this week. I wonder if you could tell us your evaluation of the situation in Laos, after the Paris Conference and what is going on there now?

A Well, we regretted that the talks, which have been going on in Paris, have not thus far shown any determination on the part of the other side to comply with the Geneva Accords of 1962. As you know, deputies remain in Paris, and there is a possibility of additional contacts; and some of the principals are now back in Laos, and they might have contacts there.

But our policy continues to be in support of the Geneva Accords of 1962. It is our very deep conviction that if all the foreigners would leave the Laotians alone, they would work out their own affairs without violence, and there would be no threat to any of their neighbors. We see no reason why, if there is a modicum of good will

on the other side, that we could not pick up the 1962 Accords and bring about the full implementation of those Accords, because the underlying policy of those Accords must leave the Laotians alone so that they could work out their own affairs in their own way.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

A Thank you.

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